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Abstract
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explanatory value for several areas.1
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For more than a century, the intuitive idea of general intelligence has been as-
sociated with competence for a wide range of cognitive tasks. However, this
interpretation has a critical pitfall. With limited resources, one has to choose
which tasks to prioritise. A resource-bounded intelligent agent, be it an animal
or an AI system, must concentrate its resources (brain, energy, computation,
etc.) for some pockets of problems. As a result, this preference (or special-
isation) for some problems over others would entail that a general intelligent
system with limited resources could not even exist.
Still, for more than a century, there is sustained evidence for something
that could be reasonably called general intelligence in humans [110, 73, 15], and
other animals [3, 10]. Also, there has been a fundamental interest in AI to build
general intelligence, from the early general problem solver [96], McCarthy’s call
for “generality in AI” [91], to the new expectations put on Artificial General
Intelligence [1]. How can we reconcile this evidence with the intuition that
resources must be prioritised for a limited pocket of tasks or environments?
In this paper, we disentangle this conundrum with the introduction of a
simple notion of generality that is consistent with existing evidence in all these
disciplines. This measure of generality is shown to be related to populational
notions of general intelligence in humans, groups and non-human animals, the
notion of cognitive efficiency and convergence in animal evolution, and the com-
putational views of general intelligence based on Solomonoff priors and universal
search.
Disclaimer: this report runs through very different disciplines around the
notions of generality in cognition and general intelligence. This report is not
meant to be comprehensive in the coverage of the literature. It introduces a new
generality score and goes as directly as possible to those several issues in these
disciplines that can be explained, predicted or better addressed with this notion.
For a full coverage of the literature in all these disciplines, and especially the
connections between them, the reader is recommended to have a look at [41].
2 General intelligence
The first scientific notion of general intelligence for humans, still prevalent today,
was introduced by Charles E. Spearman [110]. He observed that humans who
performed well (respectively poorly) for some cognitive tests usually performed
well (respectively poorly) at the others. He made his observations from response
matrices combining the results of respondents (humans) and tasks (test items),
such as the one shown in Table 1 (left). From the results he derived the notion
of the g factor, a latent factor that explained the variability in the matrix.
Clearly, this concept of the g factor is populational, i.e., for some other sets
of tasks and humans the g factor might be higher or lower. Consequently, the
g factor does not provide a measure of the generality of an agent. Of course,
if we are interested in the general intelligence of single persons, we could use
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the g score, an individual value estimating how much of that latent variable
each subject has, assuming some distribution parameters. However, a higher
g score means that the person has more general intelligence – if we reify this
concept from g –, but it does not indicate whether the person achieves the score
by succeeding in many tasks but failing systematically with a specific subset of
tasks. For instance, Table 1 (right) shows two agents that might have similar
aggregate score but one (πa) seems intuitively more general than the other (πb).
Table 1: Left: Representation of a generic response matrix ri,j with columns
representing the tasks (also referred to as tests or items) and the rows repre-
senting the agents (also referred to as persons or respondents). Correlations are
usually analysed between tasks (columnwise). Right: Individually, we can look
at the variances. Having the same average result (0.8), which agent, πa or πb,
is more general?
µ1    µN





πM rM,1    rM,N
µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4 µ5     
πa 0.85 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.75     
πb 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
     
In animal cognition research, especially in evolutionary terms, general intelli-
gence is usually understood populationally as well (with intra- and inter-species
factors, known as g and G). However, the drives for general intelligence are usu-
ally justified by how cognitively-demanding niches are. It seems reasonable that
nervous systems evolve with resource constraints and it seems more beneficial
to succeed in two scenarios A and B that have low cognitive demands than
to succeed in one scenario C with higher cognitive demands. Given the same
resources or evolutionary effort, a species that succeeds with A and B (but not
C) is more expectable than a species that succeeds in C (but none of A and B),
assuming the three scenarios are equally likely in the species’s environment.
Another different view of generality is based on the transitivity of perfor-
mance, which is an important indicator in some AI competitions. Actually,
for the general videogame AI (GVGAI) competition [97, 9], it has been found
that “performance is non-transitive”, meaning that “different algorithms per-
form best on different games”2. Transitivity can be expressed as follows: if πa is
worse than πb and πa solves µ then πb should also solve µ. That would suggest
that πb dominates πa, and would make πa redundant. Actually, if there is a
strong correlation between tasks (and hence a high g factor), this is likely to
happen. But again, this property (which by definition involves two agents) is
understood for a population of agents.
2Even if the competition aims at general videogame playing, hence the name, the focus is
ion finding non-transitivity, such that metalearning through hyper-heuristics and algorithm
portfolios is effective [9, 94], by combining where some agents are good while others are bad,
and vice versa. This is also a common thing in ensemble methods [78], where diversity is
positive if results are to be combined.
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In order to identify an individual measure of generality we could look at the
variance of results for a particular individual. A low variance would indicate
generality, as we can see in Table 1 (right). However, this is somehow assuming
that all tasks have similar difficulty because, otherwise, we would expect agents
to behave better for easy tasks and worse for difficult tasks. When selecting
a battery of tests, the items are grouped and their difficulties are chosen so
that we have tests that are informative. For instance, Spearman would have
never considered a mathematics test for which all students score perfectly (all
questions are easy) or all students fail systematically (all questions are difficult).
However, in an uncontrolled and ungrouped scenario, tasks may be of a wide
range of difficulties. Consequently, small variances would be simply unnatural.
The panorama changes completely if we consider generality as solving a
wide range of tasks up to a given difficulty, a value that can also be roughly
identified with the capability (and the internal capacity) of the individual. This
correspondence – and duality – between difficulty and ability is at the core
of cognitive measurement, especially in item response theory [23, 13], where
latent factors are estimated from a population of items and respondents after
the assumption of some parametric models and distributions.
In the next section we will introduce an individual (non-populational) notion
of generality that takes difficulty into account in the first place. The rest of the
paper explores its properties and the explanatory value of this new unifying
notion for human intelligence (psychometrics), animal intelligence (comparative
cognition) and machine intelligence (artificial intelligence).
3 Individual generality
We will consider the evaluation of a set of M agents on a set of N tasks, with
results or responses ri,j for each agent πj and task µi, as represented in Table 1
(left). For each agent we have its response mean r̄j  Meanirri,js, also referred
to as agent average performance, and its response variance σ2j  Varirri,js, also
referred to as agent variance, defined as its populational variance3.
We could simply define one notion of regularity as the reciprocal (inverse) of
the variance. This would give us 1{σ2a  1{0.002  500 and {σ2b  1{0.16  6.25
for agents a and b in Table 1 (right). But is the variance produced by unreli-
ability in the measurement, instability in the agent or is it because the agent
really performs much better at some problems than others? Let us first exclude
all sources of unreliability and work at the definitional level. In order to do this,
instead of actual responses, we are interested in expected (or ideal) responses.
For each agent πj and an instance or task µi, the expected response is given
by Errsi,j . We assume 0 ¤ Errsi,j ¤ 1 with 0 meaning worst possible perfor-
mance and 1 meaning best possible performance. We now discretise expected
responses as Ai,j  1 (‘acceptable’ or ‘accomplished’) if Errsi,j ¥ 1  ϵ and 0
3For binary responses, we have a Bernouilli distribution, and the variance is just reduced
to r̄j  p1 r̄jq.
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otherwise (‘unacceptable’ or non-accomplished), where 1ϵ is just a threshold4.
For instance, for dichotomous tasks (where agents can only be right or wrong),
with an ϵ  0.3, we have that Ai,j is 1 if the agent is expected to be correct on
the instance at least 70% of the times.
This simple transformation eliminates reliability issues in our analysis of
generality. But still, can we define generality as being good for all possible
problems? First, for many sets of tasks N it is not possible to have acceptable
results for all of them, as some may be very complex or may require more
resources than the agent has. Second, if we use binary acceptability, we would
have a Bernouilli distribution, and the variance would be linked to the average
of results (r̄j  p1 r̄jq).
The way-out of these two problems is to look at responses in terms of their
difficulty. Actually, agents might be better for easy problems than for hard ones.
Any meaningful notion of generality should not ignore this possibility. Actually,
it should place its quantification at its core.
3.1 Agent characteristic curves (ACCs) and capability
Let us then consider a function of difficulty5, ~, mapping each task µi to a real
value ~pµiq ¥ 0. We define an agent characteristic plot for agent πj as a scatter
plot showing accomplishment Ai,j in terms of the difficulty ~i. In other words,
we plot difficulty on the x-axis and accomplishment on the y-axis.
We can convert these scatter plots (as the dots are always 0s and 1s) into
more interpretable curves. In order to do this, we define ψ
rhs
j  PpAi,j 
1|~pµiq  hq, or equivalently, the mean of the accomplishment of agent j on all
problems of difficulty h. We then define an agent characteristic curve (ACC) as
a plot of ψ
rhs
j as a function of h. Figure 1 shows six scatter plots (grey circles)
and their corresponding ACC (blue line).
We say that an agent characteristic curve is s-saturated if @h ¤ s : ψrhsj  1.
We see that the two first ACCs are not even saturated for s  0. We want agent
characteristic curves to ensure that the area under these curves is finite. We
will assume difficulty functions that meet this property. We will come back
on this later but setting a threshold on tasks ensures this when difficulty is
defined in terms of minimal resources [41], especially in situations where there
is a minimum percentage given by chance. Another simpler option is just to set
a maximum difficulty.







i.e., the sum of all the mean responses per difficulty, which is the area under the
ACC (see Figure 1 for the calculated capabilities). Note that in a discrete way,
4The value of ϵ might be different for each task. Actually, by changing the threshold we
change the difficulty of the task, which is actually like having another task.
5As we will see in the following sections, the difficulty function can be derived from the
characteristics of the tasks or it can be derived experimentally from the results of a population.
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Figure 1: Agent characteristic curves (ACC), showing the behaviour of six dif-
ferent agents in terms of difficulty ~ on the x-axis. The responses ri,j for the
items i are shown in grey circles. The means for each difficulty are shown in
blue, and connected to form an ACC. We see that different distributions of
results give different values for the metrics: response variance (σ2j ), capability
(ψj), expected difficulty (Hj), spread (zj) and generality (γj). Curves that have
a steplike shape have high generality.
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capability is a weighted sum of all tasks according to a prior uniform distribution
(or weight) of difficulties. The area will of course change even with a monotonic
transformation on difficulty, such as a change to a logarithmic scale. Some scales
make more sense than others and give a more meaningful notion of capability,
especially if the x-axis can be associated with an additive unit, as we will discuss
later on. These weights can be derived if we know the posterior, how many tasks
we have for each difficulty.
3.2 Definition of individual generality
In order to introduce a measure of generality that accounts for agents that
perform generally well for all problems of low difficulty, we must look at how
compacted the curve is on the left, or how much step-like it is. This is tan-
tamount to analysing how well-employed the effort to achieve the capability
is, understanding that this effort is given by the difficulty of the task. This is





h  ψrhsj dh (2)
As capability represents the “mass” (how much of accomplishment we have), we
can normalise this moment (dividing by capability, so that ψ
rhs
j is normalised
to a density function), and we have the expected difficulty for agent j:
Hj  Eirh|Ai,j  1s  mj
ψj
(3)
In other words, Hj is actually the expected difficulty if we sample items using
the agent accomplishment as probability.
Now, if we look at Hj as an expected difficulty, then, for a distribution that
is fully compacted on the left (a step function), this should be half of the capa-
bility. This difference (multiplied by capability back again and finally squared
rooted, to make it independently of location and with a unit commensurate with
difficulty, as we will see) is known as spread, and is given by:
zj 
b
p2Hj  ψjq  ψj 
b
2mj  ψ2j (4)
If we take capability as a location on the x-axis, spread would be interpreted as
measuring how much (and how far) the mass spreads over the left and right of
that location.







It is important to note that γj is just a metric that can be applied to any possible
set of points or a function in the domain ¥ 0 and in the range r0, 1s, provided
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the used difficulty leads to a finite area under the curve. There is no parametric
model assumed. Actually, γj does not rely on any model. For instance, the
middle left plot in Figure 1 follows a logistic function while the middle right
and the two bottom plots in Figure 1 follow an error function (proportional to
the cdf of a normal distribution).
3.3 Properties of generality
Before looking into how the definition of generality fits in with several disciplines,
let us analyse its formal properties, jointly with capability. First, we need to
introduce the notion of difficulty translation, defined as a constant shift on the
x-axis (h   k Ð h). If k is negative we have a translation to the left, where
every result with h   0 is cut out. If k is positive we have a translation to the
right, and we assume that ψ
rhs
j  1 for all h   k (i.e., we saturate the newly









Now we have some simple properties6:
1. Translation: any positive translation by k implies that capability becomes
ψj   k. The same happens for negative translation if the |k|-leftmost
part of the original curve was saturated. On the other hand, generality is
invariant to translation (with the same conditions as above for negative
translation).
2. Compactness: with equal capability, any equal mass moved to the left of
the plot such that ψ
rh1:h2s
j Ð ψrh1:h2sj   q while ψrh3:h4sj Ð ψrh3:h4sj  q,
with h2   h3, will increase γj .
3. Maximum: given a fixed capability ψj , the minimum expected difficulty
Hj and the maximum generality γj are obtained with a step agent char-
acteristic function on h  ψj , where the capability is double the expected
difficulty (i.e., ψj  2Hj), and generality γj  8.
4. Given a constant function ψ
rhs
j  c from 0 to q, we have ψj  cq, zj a
cp1 cqq and γj  1{
a
cp1 cqq. In the particular case of c  0.5 we
have z  q{2 and γ  2{q.
5. Task transitivity: if an agent πj is s-saturated then for every task µb such
that Ajb  1 in the saturated area then fo all other tasks a of ~pµaq ¤ ~pµbq
we have that Aja  1. In other words, if this agent solves a task in the
saturated area then it also solves any other easier task. Agents with
maximum generality γj  8 are s-saturated with s  ψj , so once a task
of a given difficulty is solved there is no need of checking easier tasks.
6The proofs are straightforward, but they can be found in the appendix.
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6. Agent transitivity: if two agents πa and πb have maximum generality
γa  γb  8 and ψa ¤ ψb then for every task µi such that Aai  1 we
have that Abi  1. That means that πb dominates πa or, in other words,
that an agent would solve all tasks a less capable agent solves, provided
both have maximum generality. Note that if generality is not infinite, it is
not sufficient to have a curve for πb that covers the curve for πa. We need
to check that πb is s-saturated for at least the maximum value where πb
gets non-zero accomplishment.
7. Same units: if we introduce a unit for difficulty, let us call it bints (for
basic intelligence units), then capability is also (additively) measured in
bints, spread is also measured in bints and hence generality is measured
in 1{bints.
Some of these properties (especially the transitivities) have been shown when
assuming a Guttman (or deterministic) response model [30, 31], as we will dis-
cuss in the next section. Looking again at Figure 1 we see that the bottom left
and bottom right are basically a translation of each other by k  4. We see that
the capability is increased by approximately 4, and the spread and generality
are not significantly affected.
The translation property (#1) shows a way of increasing capability without
losing generality, an indication of how more general and more capable systems
are possible, for both artificial and natural systems. In principle, capable sys-
tems do not have to be necessarily more or less general, which links well with
the question of Spearman’s law of diminishing returns, as we will explore in the
next section. But note that the compactness and maximum properties (#2 and
#3) suggest an optimal way of getting a given capacity, if the difficulty of a task
is understood as (or related to) the effort for finding a solution to the task. We
will revisit this problem in relation to the convergent evolution of intelligence
and theoretical measures of computational effort and difficultly. Finally, the
task and agent transitivities relate to many issues of measurement in human
intelligence and artificial intelligence, from the g factor to the c factor.
In the following sections we will explore some and other of these phenomena
about general intelligence in three major disciplines: human intelligence, mostly
in psychometrics, animal intelligence from an evolutionary perspective and AI,
especially about the quest of AGI and metrics of general intelligence. The
following sections are meant to be sufficiently independent for those readers
that are interested in or familiar with only one or two of these disciplines.
4 Psychometric interpretation: generality, the g
factor, SLODR and the c factor
In this section we will analyse the interpretation of the notion of generality in
the context of the science and literature of human intelligence. We will first
flesh out the clear connections and inspirations, and then we will explore some
other more profound implications.
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4.1 Related metrics and models: person-fit, Guttman scales,
reliability and variable-θ models
Psychometricians will find the previous sections familiar in some ways. The use
of two parameters, difficulty for items, and ability for subjects is common in
classical test theory and especially in item response theory [23, 13]. Also, plot-
ting the performance, or the probability of correct response, against ability on
the x-axis leads to the item characteristic curves. Similarly, plotting this against
difficulty on the x-axis leads to subject or person response curves [117, 115]. It
is important to note, however, that in IRT, both ability (usually denoted by θ)
and difficulty (usually denoted by b in logistic models) are latent factors, which
are estimated by making several assumptions: “1) local independence, 2) unidi-
mensionality, and 3) a specified shape for the item characteristic curve.” [114].
The shape is determined by a model, which is usually a decreasing monotonic
function on bθ, such as a logistic function. Then the parameters are estimated
from a response matrix ri,j .
In our case, we are not considering a measurement problem (yet), and we are
not (necessarily) plotting latent variables. Difficulty could be a notion derived
from the items themselves, and capability —and not ability— is not the parame-
ter of any function. Actually, we define capability —and we use a different term
on purpose— as an area, and not the location of the steepest point of any curve.
For models that are symmetric at y  0.5, such as 1PL or 2PL logistic models,
the area equals this location. However, for irregular curves not following a model
at all, it is the area what is really meaningful. Also, we are not plotting correct
response, but whether the expected response is above a threshold, because we
are considering the true/expected values (not the measurement problem where
we only have one or a few samples of each pair of item and person).
The key question about the assumptions in IRT is that even if some models
allow for a discrimination parameter for the items, so that that the correlation
between correct response and ability for all items is relaxed (it might even be
negative), this is not usually the case for the ability. For many models, IRT is
actually assuming a strong (negative) correlation between correct response and
difficulty for all agents. Note, by the way, that a step ACC does not maximise
(negative) correlation (it is actually 0.866). The models (not even the variable-
θ ability models we will mention below) consider that a subject being better at
difficult items than easy items is an aberration, mostly because the models and
estimations are done in such a way that this is assumed not to happen (or should
just show a bad fit to the model).
This has actually led to a myriad of person-fit metrics [93], which is a way
of analysing subjects at the individual level. This aims at identifying cases
such as “low-ability examinees who copy answers to several difficult items from
a much more able neighbor and very high-ability examinees fluent in another
language but not yet fluent in English, who misunderstand the wording of sev-
eral relatively easy questions” [114]. But in the end, all this is about whether
the observed curve matches the expected curve. This was not meant to mea-
sure generality. Actually, a step function is usually categorised as overfitted by
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person-fit metrics, because it deviates from the usual logistic models (for which
infinite discriminations and hence infinite slopes are rare).
As there are so many person-fit metrics, some of them are relatively similar
to γ, as we defined in previous sections. Especially relevant are those that
compare the person response curve with a Guttman conformal curve, which is
a curve that is right for the first r items of lowest difficulty and wrong for the
rest (a step function). In this setting, the closest metric seems to be the norm
conformity index [113], which basically counts how many ranking mismatches
there are between a Guttman curve and an observed curve. Another very related
metric is the disagreement index [75], where the agreement index (the sum of
the results multiplied by the difficulty index for all items) is compared with the
score of the Guttman conformal curve with the same number of correct responses
(NC score). Since all these metrics are ordinal, and convert the difficulty of the
items to ranks (index), the correspondence to γ is only direct when we have a
uniform distribution of items per difficulty. In other words, all these metrics
take all instances as equally valuable —the NC score is the number of counts,
the number of correct responses—, while the agent characteristic curves shown
in Figure 1 sum with the assumption of difficulties being uniformly distributed.
So, if there are more items for some difficulty values than others, the count (the
NC score) and the area (the capability) would be different and all metrics would
differ. This is intentional, as we are not interested in a capability according to
a set of items, but according to different levels of difficulty. We are at the
theoretical level, or on expectation. Actually, for many difficulties, the number
of items might be infinite. So, assuming an uneven number of items per difficulty
does not have more support than assuming them uniform.
Still, because many of these metrics take the step function as a reference, it
is important to look at the Guttman scale or, more precisely, the deterministic
model [30, 31], which can be considered a precursor of IRT. A deterministic
model just captures the item response curve as a step, i.e., the probability of
correct response is 0 for values below the ability θ and elsewhere. This model
produces agent response curves that are also a step —the Guttman conformal
curves— and, hence, they would have infinite generality. Several properties
derive when items (and hence agents) follow this model. In particular, task
transitivity and agent transitivity are true under this model, as we have shown
in section 3.3 (properties #5 and #6).
The Guttman scale assumes monotonicity (higher probability of response for
higher ability), but there are many other models (some non-parametric [95, 105]
and some parametric [23, 13]) assuming this. The Guttman model has been used
in cases where solving one item means all items of lower levels of difficulty have
to be solved as well. For instance, at the lowest level of difficulty one might
have addition and then at the next level we can have multiplication. Arguably,
one cannot do any multiplications without knowing addition (although there are
very simple cases such as multiplications by zero or by one that do not require
any addition in the process). In general, the Guttman model does not hold for
practical sets of items, and it is mostly used because of its simplicity.
It is important, hence, to say that our notion of generality is not assuming
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the Guttman model for items (or a non-ordinal version of it) or a conformal
Guttman curve, but just measuring how far the expected responses of an agent
are from that theoretical situation.
Finally, there is a clear resemblance of the notion of generality with “person
reliability”, as introduced by Lumsden [85]. The notion of reliability wants
to capture “tremor effects”, i.e., each person has a variability on its ability
θ. Actually, Lumsden models this reliability with a normal distribution and
then the agent characteristic curve turns out to be its CDF. For constant-θ
IRT models, like the traditional logistic models or the Guttman model, the
theoretical agent characteristic curve has the same slope for all respondents.
This changes for variable-θ IRT models, where reliability is introduced as an
extra parameter (sometimes sacrificing the discrimination parameter, depending
on the degrees of freedom).
In general, without considering any particular model, an agent can get con-
stant θ, with no reliability issues at all, and still have a flat curve. Simply,
the agent is consistently bad at easy problems, like the two top plots on Fig-
ure 1. It is only when we limit ourselves to some particular models that we can
understand the slope of the curve as a reliability. In other words, variable-θ
models assume “that the person trait level varies during test administration”
[25]. By using expected values and thresholds transforming them into accom-
plishment values we exclude the reliability component and we focus exclusively
on generality.
Perhaps because of this confusion between reliability and generality, the
agent reliability metrics are not as widespread as the person-fit metrics com-
monly used for constant-θ IRT models. But we have to be careful about person-
fit: “From a constant-θ point of view, person reliability can be considered as a
source of misfit or overfit at the individual level. Thus, the imprecise, highly
unreliable respondent [...] will produce an almost random pattern that will be
regarded as misfitting. At the other extreme, the highly reliable respondent is
expected to produce a highly scalable response pattern that fits the stochastic
model too well and that will be regarded as overfitting”. Here, in contrast, with
the individual metric of generality, we are not considering any model to fit. For
generality we just examine the distribution of the expected responses in terms
of difficulty.
Once the differences between generality and reliability are clarified at the
conceptual level, we may be interested in the connections at the formulaic level.
For instance, if we generate expected responses according to a normal distri-
bution (like the middle right and the two bottom plots in Figure 1), with a
standard deviation σ we have the following7:
Proposition 1. Assuming a normal distribution on the capability, with stan-





Less trivially, we can show the following lemma and proposition:
7Proofs in the appendix.
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Lemma 2. Assuming a normal distribution on the capability, with mean µ
and standard deviation σ, such that the location is sufficiently beyond 0 to have
negligible mass below 0 (i.e., µσ " 0), we have that mj  σ
2 µ2
2 .
Proposition 3. With the same assumptions as lemma 2, we have that spread
zj  σ and γ  1σ .
The definition of person reliability was just 1{σ [25], so we see the equiv-
alence between reliability and generality if the agent had an ACC that were
complementary of a normal CDF. However, in our case we do not understand
σ as the standard deviation of capability or its measurement and there is no
special reason why this should be normal.
4.2 From individual generality to populational generality:
manifolds and the g factor
As we mentioned in section 2, Charles Spearman found an important phe-
nomenon; when he analysed a set of different tests taken by the same popu-
lation, and calculated the correlations between tasks (ρa,b for each pair of tasks
a and b on a result matrix such as the one shown in Table 1), he found a posi-
tive average correlation (ρ̄ " 0). In other words, the individuals that obtained
good results for some tests usually obtained good results for the rest. This cor-
relation was stronger the more culture-fair and abstract the tests were. This
phenomenon was known as the ‘positive manifold’ [110, 111]. It is important
to clarify that this phenomenon is not a property of the tests (tasks) alone nor
a property of the population (agents) alone. A correlation is clearly an effect
that takes place for two tests for a set of subjects, but the average correlation is
calculated from the correlation matrix, thereby involving all the tests and all the
agents in the population. Nevertheless, the positive manifold appeared again
and again for different human populations and different sets of tests, provided
they were not too linked to particular cultural or educational backgrounds (e.g.,
a chess-playing test or a Korean vocabulary test).
Spearman tried to understand the findings through the invention of a rudi-
mentary factor analysis. He identified a dominant latent factor that explained
much of the subjects’ variance, and called it the g factor. Since then, this factor
has been one of the most relevant (and replicated) findings in psychometrics
[73, 112] and has been found to predict many facets of life, from academic
performance to (lack of) religiosity in humans. The dominance of g and its
explanatory character for the positive manifold led to the association of g with
general intelligence, a latent factor that was said to pervade all other factors
and facets of intelligence. Of course, this interpretation has been challenged
many times, even if g appears again and again.
Note that the theory behind g allows psychometricians to estimate this factor
for individuals, giving us a latent factor that is useful in general. But still, ability
and generality are two different things. For two different people with the same
g score, we could have that one person achieves good results for other cognitive
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tests systematically but another person may get a more uneven performance
for the same set. In other words, the predictability of g scores is analysed
globally, but still some individuals may be less predictable than others. One
possible reason may be reliability8, but another reason is simply that some
individuals are less general than others. So the question was whether a general
factor emerges from human performance on a range of tests. But where does
this general factor come from in the first place? Is it a necessary result if the
individuals are general? This new question is what we try to explore below.
Let us first analyse the situation where all agents have maximum generality.
Without loss of generality, we can consider that the rows of the response matrix
ri,j are ordered by increasing capability. This means that all columns in the
response matrix ri,j would be of the following form 1
p0q, with p  q  M , i.e.,
the item response curves would follow a Guttman model. If p ¡ 0 and q ¡ 0
the correlations will be well defined and will be strictly greater than 0 and there
will be a positive manifold. Depending on the distributions of capabilities and
difficulties the magnitude of the average correlations will vary. For instance,
it is easy to see that if we consider a normal distribution of difficulties and an
equal normal distribution of capabilities, the mean correlations will be around
0.47, which is a very important positive manifold. In this situation, we see
that individual generality implies a positive manifold. We do not even need a
factor analysis to say that the individual generality extends as a populational
generality. As Guttman points out, a notion of populational generality can just
be defined “as having all correlations positive or zero”, without the need of “a
common factor” [32].
Spearman, and most of the literature after him, analysed the positive mani-
fold for tests instead of items. Tests group a number of items that are considered
to be related (e.g., a maths test) and include a range of difficulties so that we
get a range of results for the test according to the population it is going to be
applied to. So let us consider that items or tasks µi are grouped into tests τk.
Now we can construct a new response matrix where columns k are tests and
rows are agents j. We can analyse that by aggregating items into tests, mean
correlations may get much higher under different scenarios.
For instance, let us consider both item difficulties and capabilities following
the same normal distribution (sufficiently far from 0 so that there is negligible
mass below 0). In this case, we have that if we group the items randomly, we
can get mean Pearson correlations above 0.99. In general, we can relax a sample
grouping as long as the new groups preserve the item difficulty distributions.
With this condition, for each agent πj we will have exactly the same results
for all tests. As the agents have different capabilities, we will have a mean
Spearman correlation equal to 1 and, if the distributions are normal, a very
high mean Pearson correlation.
Other similar results can be obtained with some other distributions, as-
suming that each test preserves a range of difficulties such that ensures the
8With g=1 we can still have that each agent fail a different percentage of the times, but in
a completely random way. Actually, by taking a perfect agent and introducing different levels
of systematic noise to form a population, one would get perfect g. This is not generality.
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differences in capabilities to be represented per each test. This is actually a
very natural condition for a test to be informative. If all respondents got sim-
ilar values for the test, then the test would not very informative. As a result,
the only strong sufficient condition for a high manifold to appear is individual
generality.
Note that we have seen that individual generality implies populational gen-
erality (sufficiency), but this does not exclude that populational generality could
have been obtained by other means, with all agents with different abilities but
flat ACCs, as the one on Figure 1 (top left). This situation would actually
require fewer conditions on the distribution of difficulties (actually difficulties
would not play a role for these curves up to the point where the flat curve
stops) but will necessarily require a random sample per difficulty (one could
even get negative manifolds if instances are chosen on purpose to do so). Ulti-
mately, dominance between ACCs (not only different capabilities) would be a
more refined condition for this.
But only the maximally general ACCs can ensure that for every possible
partition or sampling of instances, provided the range/distribution of difficulties
is kept, the manifold is created, since the capabilities are preserved for each
subtest. This is illustrated at the top of Figure 2 in contrast with the bottom
of the same figure.
In sum, if individuals have low generality, choosing sets where a difficulty
range is preserved is less important, and the positive manifold could still appear
if the tests are not splitting the items by pockets of speciality. If this is not the
case, the manifold might even be negative. On the other hand, if individuals
have high generality, any partition of items into tests provided the range of
difficulties is preserved would lead to high positive manifolds. In any case,
negative manifolds would never appear.
Negative manifolds are very rare in the literature of human intelligence. Also,
having sets of cognitive items for which difficulty does not play a role seems very
unnatural. But still, the evidence might be compatible with some moderate
degrees of generality or some individuals being more general than others. The
plausibility (or necessity) of a particular scenario in light of a positive manifold
will depend on a series of assumptions. Of course, the sufficiency direction is
clear: if we are able to measure generality of the individuals in a population and
we know how tests are formed, we can predict the manifold.
4.3 Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns (SLODR)
and individual generality
There is another source of evidence that can help us with the analysis of the
plausibility of individual generality in light of a positive manifold. This evidence
was also first gathered by Spearman. He calculated the strength of g on subpop-
ulations of different abilities. In particular, in one of the analysis, he separated
the results of several tests on a human population into two groups: group A
with normal abilities and group B with low abilities. After the split, he analysed
the correlation matrices separately. The result was that the mean correlation
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Figure 2: Four agent characteristic curves, with the bands showing two possible
tests (red and green) grouping subsets of tasks. Top: We see two maximally
general agents. Independently of how the groups are made for the two tests,
provided the same range of difficulties is covered, the curves for each subset
would be the same and so the effect on the populational generality. Bottom:
groups can be made in such a way that the red test gets all positives for the
bottom left plot but all negatives for the bottom right plot, and the opposite
for the green test. As a result, the manifold might even be negative.
for group A was 0.47 but the mean correlation for group B was 0.78. Note that
this does not mean that group A had worse results (in fact, it was precisely
the group with highest average results), but rather that the proportion of the
variance explained by g for the low-ability group was much higher than for the
normal-ability group. This result was striking, especially if g is understood as
general intelligence. It looked as if the more intelligent a population is, the less
important g would be, in relative terms, to explain its variability. This observa-
tion turned to be known as Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns (SLODR).
The finding was replicated many times since then with different experimental
settings [16, 14, 116].
Spearman looked for an explanation and found it in the law of diminishing
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returns in economics. Many processes that are affected by many factors do not
grow continuously as the result of the increase of one factor, so the influence of a
single, albeit dominant, factor can become less relevant at a given point, being
saturated. Spearman expressed it in this way: “the more ‘energy’ a person
has available already, the less advantage accrues to his ability from further
increments of it” [111, p. 219].
But this simile was not an explanation. Spearman postulated the “ability
level differentiation”, which considered that challenging items (those that can
only be solved by the most able individuals) require the combination of many
skills, and the prevalence of g would be smaller. Basically, for the easy items,
the general intelligence or some general resources would be the only available
skills for low-ability subpopulations. Detterman and Daniel [16] argued simi-
larly that if “central processes are deficient, they limit the efficiency of all other
processes in the system. So all processes in subjects with deficits tend to operate
at the same uniform level. However, subjects without deficits show much more
variability across processes because they do not have deficits in important cen-
tral processes”. Other explanations were introduced, such as that the “genetic
contribution is higher at low-ability levels” [14].
Not only have the above explanations been put into question but the exper-
imental evidence itself has been contested. One common counter-explanation of
the phenomenon argues that it is not that g is less important for able subjects,
but that they find many of the problems in the tests less challenging than the
normal population so they are not forced to use general intelligence. They can
solve the problems without (deep) thinking, i.e., more mechanically. In other
words, the use of the same tests for both groups would be creating the effect.
Relatedly, Jensen [73, p. 587] argued that the subgroups with higher abilities
had lower variance than the subgroups with lower abilities. In fact, Fogarty and
Stankov [27] performed an experiment where the more able group had to solve
problems of higher difficulty whereas the less able group had to solve problems
of lower difficulty. Under these conditions not only did SLODR vanish but even
the more able group showed higher correlations.
This observation is more consistent with individuals having generality, such
that if the distribution of difficulties of items is not adjusted for the two sub-
populations, the items would be on the left of the steplike ACCs for many
individuals of the more able group, so the correlations of the most able group
would be smaller. Note that this would not appear for flat ACCs (with very
low individual generality).
In other words, the SLODR, without adjusting the difficulties, would not
appear if the individuals were not general at all. However, it appears if the
individuals are highly general. And it is also easy to see that if we adjust the
difficulties, so that the distributions are the same for both groups (and the
relative distributions of abilities are the same), then we would have exactly the
same manifold, so no diminishing or increasing returns.
Of course there is a pressure about resources when trying to achieve capa-
bility, and this may make the ACCs more compact for higher capability, having
more individual generality for the more able group. That would entail an aug-
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menting return, as postulated with the so-called Universal Law of Augmenting
Returns (ULOAR) [40]. We will return to these issues under an evolution-
ary framework (pressure of resources) and also a computational framework, by
looking at the invariance theorem and the stability of difficulty.
4.4 Individual generality, collective intelligence and the c
factor
Finally, let us comment very briefly about collective intelligence [127]. It seems
that maximum generality for individuals is not optimal for a group, as one
individual will dominate the rest (agent transitivity), and the result of the group
will be the result of the best agent in the group. With more specific agents, there
could be more possibilities to go beyond the most capable individual. Of course,
this depends on many assumptions about the dynamics of the groups, with the
exact outcomes easier to derive when groups just combine their capabilities by
voting or weighted voting (if confidence is used) [78, 77, 5]. We will explore this
in the context of ensemble methods later on.
Also, the aggregation of several curves could be understood as a normal
distribution on the reliability of the capability, transformed into a sigmoidal
cumulative density function for the ACC. Consequently, findings such as the c
factor [129], could be re-analysed by looking at the individual generalities first,
rather than looking at the individual g scores (or IQ scores).
5 Evolutionary interpretation: generality and
general intelligence in the animal kingdom
The study of intelligence in animals (including humans) usually distinguishes
between domain-general and domain-specific kinds of cognition. Much debate
has been held on whether or how much of these are present —or what the
ranges are— in humans and other non-human animals, and how this relates to
a modular view of the mind [26] or to a developmental domain-general learning
[100]. It is also common to analyse whether social species are associated with
more domain-general cognition, and the so-called social hypothesis (see, e.g.,
[74, 11, 122, 62]).
The definitions of what is general and what is specific also vary in the litera-
ture, but it is usually understood as coping with a wide range of cognitive tasks,
or flexibility for changing cognitive demands in an unpredictable environment
[103]. Note that this view is similar to the notion of generality we are discussing
in this report, except for the explicit use of difficulty. In our case, we say that
an animal or a species is cognitive general if it is able to perform equally well on
a wide range of problems up to a limited difficulty. This is contrast to specific
animals or species that display a smaller hardwired repertoire of domain-specific
functionalities where they excel, but are unable to cope with tasks beyond the
repertoire.
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5.1 The manifold, the g and G factors and intelligence
convergence in animal cognition
A data-driven approach to the issue of general intelligence in animal cognition
has usually been conducted with populational analyses performed on several
non-human species. Burkart et al. [10] provides the most comprehensive review
to date of the study of the correlation manifold in non-human animals, both
intra-species (denoted by g) and inter-species (denoted by G). The main conclu-
sion is that “there is increasing evidence for g in nonhuman animals, particularly
in mice and primates [...] At the interspecific level [...], studies of primates and
birds provide a robust pattern consistent with G” [10]. Basically, if we repre-
sent the performance of several individuals or species for several domains, as
shown in Figure 3, the evidence would be more in alignment with plot b, which
shows that when one individual is good in one domain is usually good at the
other domains, much in alignment to the early notions of general intelligence in
humans and the positive manifold.
Figure 3: Three different possibilities for four individuals of a single species for
four different domains D1, D2, D3 and D4. (a) The individuals behave better
for some domains than others with very small differences between the individ-
uals for each particular domain. (b) The individuals behave equally well for
all domains, but some individuals show higher performance than others, also in
a consistent way. (c) At the species level, there seems to be no difference be-
tween domains, but individuals perform differently for some domains, either by
individual differences or by “heterogeneous developmental conditions”. Copied
from Fig.1 in [10].
So we are in a very similar situation to the human case. We cannot directly
derive individual generality from these findings unless we postulate further as-
sumptions, especially in terms of the difficulties used for the items in the do-
mains. Of course, batteries are chosen such that there is variability of results
to explain, so items of different difficulty are included. This variability is ba-
sically what is been looked after (a factor that explains a great proportion of
the variance). However, it is not customary to perform a systematic analysis
of difficulty (for instance, using cognitive demands for each item or using IRT).
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Also, in the first place, the identification of domains (such that they are actu-
ally diverse) is one of the fundamental methodological issues in the analysis of
general intelligence in animals. “The issue of task selection is thus closely linked
to the identification of domains in animal cognition, which in fact is part of the
empirical question that needs to be addressed in intelligence research in animals
in general, by using batteries as diverse as possible and statistical procedures
that are a priori agnostic to the underlying factor structure” [10].
5.2 Cognitive resources and generality
Still, the references to resources (cognitive demands) required for the tasks in
several domains are usually part of the discussions. Burkart et al. [10], for
instance, set the question around how much extra neural tissue is needed, taking
into account that domain-specific cognitive adaptations may require much less
additional expensive brain tissue [119] than domain-general cognitive ability,
which is also less directly linked to fitness-relevant benefits. They face “the
puzzle that domain-general cognitive ability apparently evolved in at least some
lineages, or perhaps even in birds and mammals in general, even though its
evolution has had to overcome more obstacles compared to the emergence of
domain-specific cognitive adaptations” [10]. One possible theory that explains
this puzzle is the cognitive buffer hypothesis [2], which states that this extra effort
in domain-general cognitive processes in larger brains buffers animals against
environmental variation, and pays off for a wider range of behavioural patterns
given by innovation, learning and, most especially, cultural transmission [58,
119, 80, 107].
Evolution usually finds a trade-off between specialised functions and more
general capabilities, according to the effort that has to be put in terms of evo-
lutionary innovations and energy consumption of bigger brains on one hand
and how expectable and regular the tasks that are faced by the species are in
their environments. We can see this trade-off in Figure 4, where we compare
the gains and the efforts of a domain-general cognitive enhancement versus a
domain-specific cognitive enhancement.
Of course, how meaningful the specific numbers are depend on how well we
can estimate the effort for general solutions versus specific solutions and how
likely the specific tasks are versus all other tasks. Actually, Figure 4 assumes
that all tasks are equally likely (or, more precisely, all difficulties are equally
likely). When the probability of some specific behaviours or domains is very
likely in the environment of the species, then specialisation will of course pay
off. It is when there is environmental unpredictability that many tasks are sim-
ilarly likely, and then the pressure for more general intelligence takes us to the
kind of increase like the violet band in the figure rather than the orange one. Ac-
tually, in an environment where most tasks change in a few generations we would
have an ACC closer to the maximally compacted one and maximum generality
(as given by the compactness property, #2), as this would be resource-optimal
in order to obtain maximum capability (and maximum success if tasks are so
unpredictable). Of course, many tasks requiring cognition, such as navigating
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Figure 4: Using ACCs to represent two different ways in which the capability
of a species can be enhanced, with a domain-general cognitive enhancement
(vertical violet rectangle) or a domain-specific cognitive enhancement (horizon-
tal orange rectangle). Left: both rectangles cover the same area, and hence
increase capability in a similar amount. Right: both rectangles imply the same
extra effort (mj 
³11
10
h  1 dh  10.5 vs mj 
³17.6
10
h  0.1 dh  10.5, according
to Eq. 2), but the specific one (orange rectangle) now has a smaller area, and
hence less increase in capability than the general one (violet rectangle).
and eating —but not foraging or hunting— might still be linked to a few par-
ticular specific skills, as they are more constant in the evolutionary history of
many species.
How difficult a domain-specific functionality is or how much effort it requires
can be analysed in different ways. One first way is to look at the energy effort,
by examining the involved neurological modules that are dedicated for that
functionality, and map this with energy consumption. A second approach is
to estimate evolutionary effort by looking at changes in DNA that make the
functionality possible (from an ancestor that did not have it), contrasting with
the ecological pressures and other similar functionalities. A third pathway is
to set these tasks in an isolated or abstract way and make them be learnt by
systems that do have general capabilities, and estimate their difficulty from
them. In this case, extreme care has to be made for many confounding factors.
Finally, a fourth possibility is to determine the difficulty of tasks intrinsically
(e.g., working memory requirements, pattern complexity, etc.).
The analysis is complex, but in many ways it is what research in animal
cognition has focused on in the past decades. Without getting into these esti-
mations, many studies about general intelligence would just conclude that many
animals have a balance of general-domain and specific-domain solutions, which,
in general terms, is not very surprising. The challenge is to determine which or
at least how many cognitive skills are specific or general, or going beyond the
dichotomy of domain-specific versus domain-general [72], how much general a
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species is according to the range of tasks it solves and their difficulty. ACCs can
help analyse this visually while a notion of generality can help us analyse this
numerically, and separate this from capability. At the moment, [10] focuses on
whether the species has g and how its results may compare with other species
(through G and a comparison of magnitudes). But most of the discussion in [10]
and its responses turns around the question of whether the correlations might
be a produce of something that is not general intelligence. This has its roots
in an inadequate definition (or multiple different definitions) of general intelli-
gence, which in some cases is linked to results on tasks and in other cases it is
linked to processes. Indeed, the concept general intelligence conflates magnitude
and distribution, as the definition of ‘intelligence’, either explicitly or implicitly,
integrates a minimal degree of generality.
5.3 Looking at evolutionary selective pressure through ob-
servable scores: capability and generality
An alternative way of looking at this is in terms of two observable indexes:
capability and generality, especially if we see that some less general species are
able to solve very complex problems by specialisation that other more general
species cannot do. Plotting generality and capability against the level of social
interaction (intra-specific and by diversity of predators), cultural inheritance,
neural tissue mass, etc., with octopuses, hienas, koalas, racoons, primates and
corvids, among other species, is expected to scatter points on very different
locations. As a result, this could also help us see whether these traits are
related, or whether there might be one-directional causalities. Both capability
and generality are observable variables, the first is aggregated performance (the
area under the ACC curve, eq. 1) and the second is a metric of how compact
this performance is (how steplike it looks over difficulty, eq. 5).
Figure 5 shows a simulation where 200 individuals are generated on random
results on 200 items, and we see different selective pressures on the capabil-
ity and the cognitive effort on the individuals. As we see, not only do we get
more generality but also the correlation between capability and generality in-
creases, due to the pressure on minimising effort (while keeping or maximising
capability).
Figure 6 shows another similar simulation where items have a uniform range
of difficulty and success for the tasks is randomly proportional to the difficulty.
In both figures the correlations can get very high since the pressure goes in the
same direction: more capability and less effort. This is simply the result of
the compactness property (#3). But again, it is important to notice that as
generality and capability become more correlated (especially in humans) there
is a tendency in confounding them, and start talking about general intelligence,
without knowing clearly whether the emphasis is on generality or capability.
The theory of general intelligence, the positive manifold and the g and G
factors have all (in different degrees) raised bitter controversies. Setting aside
the interpretation issues, one of the major arguments against these theories is
that they might be considered statistical artefacts, produced as the result of
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Figure 5: Distribution of capabilities and generalities of a simulation where 200
individuals are generated on random results on 200 items. The top left plot
shows the original case with no selective pressure. This is not very interesting
as all the ACCs are flat. The top right plot performs a selection per capabil-
ity, where only those individuals with capability greater than or equal to 50%
survive. The bottom left shows a selection by effort, where only those individu-
als that require less than 100% over the minimum possible effort (a maximally
compacted ACC) survive. Finally the bottom right combines both selections at
the same time.
making some choices on the items and test batteries, such that they fit the
population of individuals (not too easy, not too difficult, so there is variance
to explain). In a very insightful way, [128] break the species groupings by
considering humans and chimpanzees together into a single population and then
correct for these “ceiling or floor effects”, by reducing the number of tests to
those that have higher coefficients of variance. Figure 7 shows the correlation
of scores (d) and g loadings on the y-axis against different values of the variance
produced by progressively selecting the tests with higher variance. Although not
mentioned in [128], this analysis is of course closely related to the SLODR (and
the alternative ULOAR hypothesis) discussed in the previous section, where by
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Figure 6: Same as Figure 5 but with examples of different difficulties (ACCs are
triangular originally). Top left: no selection. Top right: selection by capability.
Bottom Left: selection by effort. Bottom Right: selection by effort and capa-
bility. For the two bottom plots, maximum effort set to 25% over the minimum
possible effort (a maximally compacted ACC).
adjusting the variance we can get that g and scores can grow together, as we
see in Figure 7.
Of course the criticism about how tasks and individuals are chosen or split
will always be around, as these constructs are populational (on the tasks and
the individuals), and there seems to be a chicken-and-egg problem. By looking
at generality, as an individual observable measure, we can simplify the analysis
in many ways: the measure does not depend on a population of individuals (no
need to arrange them into species or groups) and it is algebraically independent
from capability (of course unless an evolutionary or other kind of efficiency
pressure is applied). For instance, actual plots like Figures 5 and 6 can be used
as an alternative to Figure 7, and done for individuals of many species together.
Another kind of criticism around the study of general intelligence is about
whether “the positive manifold provides little or no constraint on the possible
architectures of cognition” [104]. General intelligence may then originate from
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Figure 7: Correlations between task g loadings and the scores d on the y-axis as a
function of the average coefficient of variance in the tests retained, choosing them
by removing those with smallest variance first. Trends shown for chimpanzees,
humans and a combined population. Copied from [128].
primary specific modules being boosted by more general secondary modules (or
evolved in this more compressed/abstract way for the economy of the brain), by
a wide range of specific modules that are switched on or off depending on the
task at hand or by a truly general system helped by particular biases according
to what environment demands are most frequent for a species. All this diversity
of explanations could be extended to generality, as a high value of γ can be
obtained in many ways (but not as many as g, as we discussed in the previous
section). As we will see in the following section, looking at individuals that have
gone through no selective pressure, or a different one (i.e., AI systems) can give
us a wider theoretical and empirical scenario to exclude some interpretations of
the existing findings and especially on new research looking at the values of γ
and ψ in the animal kingdom.
6 Computational interpretation: generality and
artificial (general) intelligence
The debate along the spectrum between general intelligence and specific (or nar-
row) intelligence has also pervaded artificial intelligence since its inception. The
very early attempts were directed towards a General Problem Solver [96] and
the goal of “generality” [24]. In the following decades, many of these programs
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failed to fully realise the complexity of intelligence, while other more narrow
applications started to be successful.
In 1978, John McCarthy published a new version of his 1971 Turing Award
Lecture on “Generality in Artificial Intelligence” [91], recognising that one of
the major problems was that if behaviour was represented by programs, then
these programs could only cover a finite set of domains or problems.
Of course, these were the times were machine learning was not a dominant
paradigm in artificial intelligence. Nowadays, the use of machine learning tech-
niques, coupled with sufficient data, allows systems to be adapted to different
domains, using the same algorithm, which generalises the data. Generalisation
is an intrinsic —if not definitional— part of learning. Learning is hence the
way in which AI systems (and human and non-human animals) can adapt to
unseen situations. In other words, when considering a large and diverse num-
ber of tasks, coding particular solutions for all of them is infeasible, and hence
learning becomes the solution.
Consequently, it may seem that (machine) learning systems are then general
by definition: give a learning system sufficient examples and it will learn any
possible task. The goal of machine learning, and AI, would be to define this
universal machine learning system. While this idea is still behind some of the
narratives in machine learning and artificial intelligence, there is an important
objection to this universal generality: efficiency. Some systems can potentially
learn any function, given a sufficiently large number of examples. The question
is how many examples, how much time and how large the model might be.
The answer to –or cause of— tthis problem is known as bias. By embedding
a particular bias for a learning algorithm, one can accelerate learning for some
problems while making it harder for some other problems.
There are many ways of explicitly or implicitly introducing strong bias to
a learning algorithm: specialised architectures, hyper-parameters, background
knowledge, and the very algorithm itself. By using these particular biases, we
can have AI systems that can solve particular pockets of problems: speech recog-
nition, machine translation, robot navigation, medical diagnosis, face recogni-
tion, etc. Interestingly, by a shrewd use of more and more computing power,
some of these algorithms are requiring less physical time (and occasionally fewer
examples) to learn these tasks, approaching, at least in some areas, the flexiblity
of some animals.
Still, there is a view that artificial intelligence does not produce general sys-
tems. Even if the same deep reinforcement learning can learn to play Go or
Chess by just changing the rules [106], the same algorithm cannot learn to nav-
igate a room. Of course, there are algorithms that can learn to navigate a room
and have similar principles (and even shared modules underneath). However,
they need a great amount of hyperparameter tuning, input and output transfor-
mation, and other changes to the architectures and the optimisation operators
to make them work for a different domain.
Because of all this, the area known as Artificial General Intelligence [1],
where the same system must be able to solve a range of problems, is still seen
as a counterpoint to a bevy of systems that are successful for more narrow
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domains, even if they are fuelled by machine learning, and built upon general
principles looking for abstract representations.
Unfortunately, to the dismay of some members of the AGI community, the
term AGI is now commonly used as synonym of ill-defined buzzwords such
as human-level machine intelligence, human-level artificial intelligence or even
superintelligence, without a proper analysis of what the ‘G’ in AGI actually
means, and how it can be distinguished from mainstream AI [8].
6.1 Generality and all possible tasks
The reduction of AGI to anthropocentric views of intelligence has an intuitive
appeal. We are interested in those tasks humans can solve. But which are these
tasks? Or, more conspicuously, what are the tasks that humans —the hominids
characterised by their general intelligence— cannot do? We can analyse this
question and put the notion of generality to its limits by considering all possible
tasks. One possible way of doing this is by defining the set of all computable
tasks, where tasks can be framed in a testing scenario, where agents can learn
from experience. In other words, we can consider all possible learning tasks
(see [108, 109, 124, 33, 63, 41] for different ways of doing this). Apart from the
particular formulation and setting, the most relevant feature is how to distribute
a weight or distribution over all possible tasks.
Let us start with Solomonoff, who defined all possible sequential prediction
tasks and an associated distribution, the algorithmic probability [108, 109]. The
set of tasks is just defined by the problem of estimating the next bits of all the
sequences that can be produced by a universal Turing machine UTM. While
all sequences are generated, their distribution (the algorithmic probability) de-
pends on the reference UTM. In a way, this was an elegant way of representing
the notion of bias in machine learning. Depending on the chosen UTM, some
concepts will be easier to learn than others. Still, the great contribution by
Solomonoff was that he showed that the same algorithm can be used for all
UTMs (biases), and convergence can be obtained. A universal learning algo-
rithm exists, it always works, but it will work more or less efficiently depending
on the chosen bias, the reference UTM. In other words, each UTM assumes a
prior about the world, and observations whose underlying pattern is simpler for
the chosen UTM (smaller Kolmogorov complexity) are more likely than those
observations with more complex patterns. Solomonoff integrates Occam’s razor
and Epicurus, as his theory considers the combination of all theories that are
compatible with the evidence, weighted by their Kolmogorov complexity.
On the other extreme for the choice of a distribution we find the assumption
that every possible problem’s output is equally likely. In a sequential prediction
problem this would be expecting all sequences to be equally likely or, in clas-
sification problems, to consider all combinations of inputs and outputs equally
likely. This is technically known as “block uniformity” [66], with the uniform
distribution being a special case. Under this assumption, we have the conditions
for the so-called no-free-lunch theorems [126, 124, 125], leading to the conclusion
that, on average, no method can be better than any other. A general-purpose
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learning system and hence the very notion of ‘general intelligence’ would be
simply impossible [21]. Moreover, every agent would solve exactly the same
number of tasks, so there would not be any variability in capability, effort and
of course generality.
The NFL theorems are very relevant, because our observation that learning
systems exist and work (in animals and computers) can only happen if the
assumption is not true. This is a pragmatic or ab absurdum rationale, but
there are more epistemological ones: choosing all perceptions as equally likely
is difficult to reconcile with a world with physical laws and other agents around
(plants, animals, conspecifics) that do not behave randomly. Actually, if we
consider all these subsystems computable, Solomonoff’s view is more natural,
as the output of a UTM fed with random bits is not random. In other words,
what we perceive, our world, is filtered through many machines, making those
patterns that are produced from systems with limited resources more likely.
From this view of all possible tasks, one can define a (universal) distribution
according to the complexity of the generator of tasks. However, one can also
define the distribution by looking at the complexity of the solution for the task,
which can be seen as its difficulty. This way of representing/weighting solutions
by their difficulty is common in psychometrics, but was first introduced in the
context of all (sequential) tasks in [33]. When one goes from sequential tasks to
interactive tasks (such as reinforcement learning [35, 71]), the difference between
the smallest program that generates a task and the smallest program that solves
the task becomes conspicuous. Setting the distribution according to the former
led to the notion of universal intelligence [81]. Setting the distribution according
to the latter led to the notion of policy-general intelligence, assuming a uniform
distribution over solutions for each task difficulty [38, 37, 41]. We can see some
of these choices in Figure 8.
6.2 The choice of diversity and difficulty
The important thing about a theoretical account of all possible tasks, and es-
pecially if we know how we generate them, is that we can control for two things
that are crucial for generality: the diversity and the difficulty of the tasks. If
we look at diversity first, the schema on the top of Figure 8 makes it very diffi-
cult to ensure that the set of tasks is going to be diverse, as we generate tasks
according to a distribution on their definition, but not about their solutions.
Apart, if the choice is a universal distribution as in [81], then the distribution
is dominated by a few tasks coping most of its mass [59, 42]. For the schema in
the middle of Figure 8, we have at least some range of difficulties but, still, that
does not ensure that the solutions might not all end up being of the same kind.
Finally, it is the choice at the bottom of Figure 8 that ensures diversity by the
most entropic choice of a distribution per each difficulty (assuming the number
of solutions per difficulty is finite). This choice is the uniform distribution.
For instance, Figure 9 shows an ACC where instances have been generated
according to the bottom schema in Figure 8. If we consider all difficulties as
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Figure 8: Different ways of generating tasks (or deriving their distribution).
Top: the probability of a task is given by its generator. If the number of tasks
is infinite, but countable, a uniform distribution is not a viable option, and
a universal distribution must be used instead, making this equal to universal
intelligence [81]. Middle: we first define a distribution of difficulties and then
we define tasks according to that difficulty. In cases where the difficulty of a
task can be derived from the definition of the task, this is a good option, as in
[56, 33]. Bottom: again, we first define a distribution of difficulties and then we
derive solutions matching that difficulty. Finally, tasks are generated according
to the solution. This is actually an option when the definition of a tasks does
not say much about the difficulty of the solution, such as interactive tasks, as
used in [38, 37, 41]. Note that for the two last ways, if the difficulty distribution
is uniform, the expected success on a random task drawn from the distribution
is equal to the area under the ACC, which is capability, as for eq. 1. (Image
adapted from [41, Fig.9.7].)
the ACC shown in the figure, with capability ψ  9.86 and generality=0.39.
A theoretical view also allows us to consider different options for difficulty.
Having all tasks sliced by difficulty provides us with a way to understand the
success of an individual in relation to the resources used. For instance, if we
consider difficulty as the complexity of the simplest solution, there are few in-
teresting consequences. First, we have that for every agent, there is a difficulty
for which its ACC is zero, so the area is always finite. Second, we can precisely
determine how many solutions of a given difficulty there might be. For instance,
we can calculate the resources according to different situations:
• We can consider difficulty as the length of the solution with lowest Kol-
mogorov complexity, i.e., ~pµq  minπ:Aπµ1 Lpπq where Lpπq is the length
of the solution π. Then the number of solutions for a given difficulty h
would be 2h. In this situation, we can derive from the compactness prop-
erty (#2) that the optimal curve is again one with γ  8. To achieve
capability ψ, a non-learning system having predefined solutions for a large




bits, plus the necessary code or neural wiring for making the switch among
the 2ψ 1  1 solutions (assuming the solutions have nothing in common,
because exhaustiveness here makes it difficult to compress this into a more
hierarchical or reusable architecture). According to this situation, we can
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Figure 9: Average human results on exercises of different difficulty (h) in the
C-test [56, 33], with the derive metrics shown on the plot.
see that the “size” of the “brain” would grow more than exponentially.
On the contrary, if instead of predefined solutions, we consider a learning
system, the size would be reduced as much as we would like, but we would
need to consider the availability of data and the learning effort instead.
• We can understand difficulty with Levin’s Kt complexity, as advocated for
in [56, 33, 39, 50, 41] because of its connection with Levin’s optimal uni-
versal search [82, 83]. In this case, we define LSpπ, µq  Lpπq  logSpπ, µq
where L is the length of the solution π and S the computational steps µ
uses to solve the task π. Difficulty would be ~pµq  minπ:Aπµ1 LSpπ, µq.
With this, we could still consider that the number of solutions for a given
difficulty would be less than (but still approximately or linear with) 2h.
The result for a non-learning system would be then similar, but now we
will have to take into account the time to determine which problem we are
facing, which must choose between 2ψ 1  1 solutions. On the contrary,
the result for a learning system using this schema would just simply be the
expected difficulty H  ψ{2. This is measured in the logarithm of com-
putational steps9, so the expected computational steps using a universal
search would be 2ψ{2.
From the above, we see the difference between a system with a predefined reper-
toire of solutions and a system that learns those solutions10. Even if the above
9These would be the bints, as used in property 7 in section 3.3.
10Note that this is not related (and also looks apparently opposite) to the distinction between
learning tasks and knowing tasks in [118].
31
ignores the training examples or interaction needed to learn the concepts, we
see that there might be a trade-off between pre-wired and learned solutions,
depending on the size limitations and the speed of the system.
The examples above are important to clarify the distinction between nature-
vs-nurture and general-vs-specific. Whereas we have the tendency to associate
inherited functions with specific functions, this does not have to be the case a
priori, according to the definition of generality we are considering here. This
may be a consequence depending on what resources are most relevant. Note
that in the two analyses above, we derive the minimum resources following the
compactness property (#2). Assuming all difficulties equally likely, one should
focus on those policies that require fewer resources. Of course, if some particular
pockets of problems of high difficulty are more likely than many problems of low
difficulty then there is a rationale to cover those pockets specifically, so having
less generality.
In all these cases we are using a distribution of tasks that is not based on a
particular species or environment —they are not the tasks a human or animal
would find in their lifetime. Accordingly, these distributions can be criticised as
arbitrary. However, it is not true that all humans (and much less all animals)
face the same fixed set of tasks. Precisely because of this, many psychometric
tests include very abstract tasks, in an effort to be independent of particular
human groups, and some (like Raven’s matrices) may even look very unrelated
to the natural (ancient or modern) environments humans face. However, it is
well known that IQ tests lack measurement invariance when applied to other
groups (e.g., people with some disabilities, children, etc.), non-human animals
and, most especially, computers. In the latter case, it is not that they are
particularly unfair for computers, but that AI systems can specialise for these
tasks [18, 7, 55, 88]. In a way, we can get generality inside the test, but a high
specialisation to the tasks that are outside the test. Restricting to a particular
kind of tasks facilitates systems that specialise on them, and this is particularly
exploited in AI.
Hence the idea of using all tasks. Still, how much will the task distribution
depend on the representational language or mechanisms used to derive the set
of tasks? The invariance theorem, independently introduced by Solomonoff,
Kolmogorov and Chaitin (see, e.g., [84]) says that any universal representational
mechanism (language) can code any program as efficiently (in size) as any other
up to a constant that is bounded by (but generally smaller than) the sizes
of the definitions of both languages. This makes the concept of Kolmogorov
complexity machine-independent, at least to an additive constant factor.
However, the definition of “universal intelligence” [81] has been criticised by
this dependence on the reference machine, which is actually leading to different
definitions according to what UTM is used to generate the universal distribution
[59, 42, 41]. The main reason is that the invariance theorem appears in the
exponent of the distribution (2Kpxq), and the additive constant becomes an
exponential one. In contrast, the two versions on the bottom of Figure 8 put
back the invariance theorem as an additive constant on the scale of difficulty.
This means that the scale upon which all other measures are derived is relatively
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more stable. For instance, given the spread for an individual using a notion of
difficulty on a reference machine, then this spread will be at most increased by
a constant that does not depend on the individual. Also, as capability grows,
the invariance theorem starts having more relevance. This can also be seen as
the issue that systems with very limited resources (or capabilities) will be more
dependent on the reference machine.
Still, using two different reference machines might lead to very different x-
axes for the ACC and hence different capability and generality scores, which is of
course what underlies many discussions about whether tests are biased against or
in favour of a group. But there are many “bias equalisers”, especially in testing,
that can be used to determine capabilities and generality more independently
[45, 44, 20]: 1) introducing a testing apparatus that is novel for all subjects, 2)
analysing groups after they are raised in or adapted to the same culture or using
the same language, 3) present problems that have to be solved by combining
or using a set of constructs or elements that are abstract and new. These
procedures are common in animal cognition and human intelligence testing, but
not that much in AI research [36, 69, 67].
In practice, we do not need to consider all possible tasks to derive metrics of
generality in AI. We can do this for any test battery or benchmark for which we
are interested in deriving the generality of a particular AI algorithm or agent,
be it in machine learning, planning or machine translation. In order to start we
only need a metric of difficulty. It does not have to be a universal metric, as
described above, but a customised one instead. It can be derived in many ways:
• Anthropocentric difficulty: we can use human performance as a reference
for the difficulty of a set of tasks. This can be obtained as an indicator
that is inversely related to the success of average humans in each task.
• Populational difficulty: this can be derived by using a population of AI
techniques for the range of problems. For instance, [90] apply IRT to derive
the difficulty of machine learning instances. This idea can be applied to
datasets and other kinds of problems in AI (e.g., the ALE benchmarks,
[89]).
• Intrinsic difficulty: any meaningful characterisation of difficulty can be
used here. For instance, the difficulty of a planning problem can be based
on a series of features about the problem:, such as the number of com-
ponents, its structure, the degree of noise, etc. Note that difficulty is
different from computational complexity, but time complexity may be an
important factor.
• Integral difficulty: some other notions of difficulty can integrate space
resources, computational time, energy consumption, data required, etc.,
especially when including very different tasks. For instance, [101] aligns
difficulty with the number of trees used by a random forest classifier,
providing a very clean mapping to resources and effort..
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• Opponent difficulty: in those cases where other agents compete or coop-
erate, we can use the capability of the opponents (or a measure inversely
related to the capability of cooperators). Note that this makes this option
populational as well.
In general, whenever an evaluation procedure is established in AI, there is a
selection of tasks from a certain domain and for a particular range of difficulties.
For instance, one rarely finds Hofstadter’s “Gödel, Escher, Bach” [61] as an
instance for a machine translation benchmark. It is too hard to be discriminative
for AI. Usually, the benchmark tasks are selected to cover an application area
(usually of scientific or industrial interest) and the difficulty of the items is
chosen such that they are neither too easy nor too difficult for the state-of-
the-art algorithms. This is natural, but this is implicitly assuming a type of
ACC nobody checks in the first place, and a very malleable notion of difficulty,
adapted to the situation. This also makes the analysis of progress in AI hard
to assess, as the tasks in the domain and their difficulty are changing, like a
moving target.
6.3 Generality in competitions and benchmarks in AI
These options for difficulty can be applied to an increasing range of AI compe-
titions and benchmarks [51], especially those that are aiming at more general-
purpose AI. Some of these are the general game playing AAAI Competition
[28, 29], the reinforcement learning competition [123, 17] (which featured the
‘polyathlon’, with several domains), the genetic programming benchmarks [92,
121], the general video game competition [102, 99], and the arcade learning en-
vironment (ALE) [6, 102], a collection of Atari 26000 video games, which “has
incentivized the AI community to build more generally competent agents” [86].
It is important to note that the introduction of new platforms and benchmarks
where hundreds of tasks can be potentially be implemented [12, 52] is not usually
accompanied with a verification that the agents that have highest performance
are also more general. Recognising that the diversity and difficulty of the tasks
must be explicitly determined is one important outcome of our analysis so far,
and a metric of generality in these terms would help to flesh out.
From all the ways in which difficulty can be introduced, and hence generality
can be obtained, we are going to illustrate the last case of the bullet list in the
previous subsection (“opponent difficulty”). This choice is motivated as it seems
less evident than the rest and has interesting connections with competition
ratings and some particular notions of transitivity. In particular, we are going
to analyse the results of the World Computer Chess Championship (WCCC),
usually part of the Computer Olympiad, where several computer chess players
compete against each other. Figure 10 shows the ACCs of the participants of
the 2005 and 2015 editions, taking the score of the opponent as difficulty (if two
or more opponents ended up with the same score, they are considered together
as “tasks” of the same difficulty=. This is why we have values on 1 (wins), 0.5
(draws), 0 (losses), but also some other values.
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ψ Zappa: ψ 10.12 γ 0.28
Fruit: ψ 7.75 γ 0.30
D.Sjeng: ψ 7.25 γ 0.49
Shredder: ψ 7.25 γ 0.49
Crafty: ψ 6.50 γ 0.38
Junior: ψ 7.00 γ 1.10
Diep: ψ 7.12 γ 0.32
Jonny: ψ 5.62 γ 1.11
The Baron: ψ 4.50 γ 0.40
IsiChess: ψ 3.75 γ 0.27
T.C.Bishop: ψ 3.25 γ 0.81
Fute: ψ 1.88 γ 0.26
Avg. γ 0.52
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ψ 7.25 γ 0.64
Komodo: ψ 6.50 γ 1.15
Hiarcs: ψ 5.12 γ 0.41
Protector: ψ 5.62 γ 0.51
Shredder: ψ 5.38 γ 0.52
Ginkgo: ψ 4.38 γ 0.51
The Baron: ψ 3.88 γ 0.63
Maverick: ψ 1.75 γ 1.14
Fridolin: ψ 0.62 γ 2.28
Avg. γ 0.87
Figure 10: ACCs for all the participants in the World Computer Chess Champi-
onship using the final score of the opponent as difficulty. Left: Reykjavik 2005
with 12 participants. The winner (Zappa) and the last one (Fute) won and lost
all matches respectively except the one between them, which was surprisingly
a draw. Right: Reykjavik 2015 with 9 participants. Here, no low-rank beat a
high-rank participant, and draws were usually between participants with close
scores. Accordingly, the average generality is much higher in this case. Data
from https://www.game-ai-forum.org/icga-tournaments/game.php?id=1.
We see in Figure 10 that curves are decreasing and generally quite steep, and
generalities are relatively high. From the aggregate numbers we could conclude
that the 2015 edition has more general players. Nevertheless, we have to be a
little bit more careful, as the notion of difficulty here is populational and both
populations are not the same (not even in number of participants), so they
are not comparable. This is one of the issues of using populational notions of
difficulty.
In this particular scenario, we can also conclude that the degree of transitiv-
ity is high, in light to the generality values. Note that in adversarial settings like
chess, agent transitivity and task transitivity are two sides of the same coin, as
tasks are opponents, which are also participants. Of course, there are more spe-
cific metrics to produce scores in tournaments (e.g., the Elo rating [22] or more
sophisticated schemes [4]), but this example illustrates how to apply the indi-
vidual generality score to a situation where the difficulty of a task depends on
other agents taking place in a competing or cooperating role, which is especially
necessary for social and adversarial situations [43, 68, 70].
This is also especially interesting for systems that improve with self-play, like
AlphaZero [106]. In these settings, it is important to check that the system does
not get better and better against more competitive opponents but may end up
losing (or drawing more frequently) against weak opponents. This leads us to
the more general question of whether a system that develops over time becomes
more or less general [53, 87]. As the system evolves, we may experience less
flexibility but a wider covering of tasks, and this can be studied using metrics
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of capability and generality. It is also interesting to analyse those tasks where
transitivity may be more problematic (and hence generality). For instance,
matching pennies [60, 54, 47] is a game where a random agent has an expected
result of 0.5 with whatever other opponent, resulting in a very flat ACCs. If
many of these agents are included in a population of opponents, then it will
become very difficult to attain generality.
In the end, the progress of some techniques in AI can be made in such a
way that generality is preserved, and the ACCs are just translated to the right
as the technology improves. We now have tools to check whether this is the
case, or some new techniques solve more challenging problems at the cost of
being worse at simpler problems. This is particularly relevant as progress in
AI can be attained by combining several approaches, in areas such as ensemble
learning or portfolios, where a big switch approach determines which technique
is most appropriate for a particular instance. This modular approach to solving
problems may well end up in specific solutions and creating gaps, where some
relatively simple problems are not solved, with lack of generality. But this
modular approach, combining many specific solutions, if the set of tasks remains
constant, may increase generality (and capability), especially if the combination
covers more of the easy ones than the difficult ones. Again, we see that generality
measures how capability is distributed in terms of difficulty, but it does not
impose constraints on how this is done. It may even include human computation,
collective systems, cognitive services or hybrids, in the same way that humans
can be enhanced by personal assistants or other devices and increase or decrease
their generality because of this.
Of course, if a modular solution requires hundreds of specific subsolutions,
the cost of keeping all them and designing an appropriate and efficient switch
to determine which one to use may end up being less efficient than a more in-
tegrated solution, as we have discussed above. The relation between generality
and resources is another way of looking at compression and generalisation, Oc-
cam’s razor, the MML principle, etc., in machine learning, genetic programming
and other areas in AI (e.g., [120, 79, 19]). Actually, the issues of generalisation
and difficulty were usual (although from a different perspective) in the early
days of genetic programming [76] (using the term ‘generality’ as ‘generalisa-
tion power’ or ‘avoiding overfitting’). Commonly, the notion of generalisation
is usually linked to whether a model extrapolates from the training data to the
test data, and a proper validation will just equate this with performance. But,
generality, as introduced in this report, just measures the distribution of success
across difficulties, and can be applied to learning problems, planning problems,
deductive problems, more in the original spirit of McCarthy [91]. This is in the




We started with the implausible assumption that generality can be seen as a
cognitive system behaving well on a wide range of tasks, independently of their
difficulty. While this might be the case for theoretical, idealistic, agents (e.g.,
AIXI [65, 64]), it fails to accommodate the fact that resource-bounded agents
will necessarily fail on an infinite number of tasks, simply because they are
beyond their capacity. From here, we could conclude that any system specialises
for the subset of problems that are easy according to its resources. Comparing
degrees of generality would then be a chimera.
We can escape this apparent contradiction by putting difficulty at a fore-
most place from the very start, trying to derive measures of difficulty that are
independent, or at least sufficiently invariant or fair, to the agents that we want
to evaluate. It is not surprising that the notion of difficulty has a prominent role
in psychometrics, and it is also pervading the evaluation of non-human animals,
either deriving from the analysis of the cognitive resources needed (working
memory, size of the solution, etc.) or emanating from populational approaches
(e.g., using IRT).
Once we establish a metric of difficulty for a range of tasks, and we see the
results of an agent as an agent characteristic curve, we see that the notions
of capability and generality appear as the two most descriptive indicators to
summarise the curve. If the results follow a monotonic decreasing function,
these would correspond to metrics of location and slope respectively, as observed
from several models in item response theory.
However, we have seen that, because it is so unnatural to think that an agent
can score equally well for easy and difficult tasks, most approaches in the analysis
of human and non-human animal intelligence somehow assume this (decreasing)
monotonicity in the process, and the whole analysis ends up mixing capability
and generality. Actually, if an agent is shown to have poor generality, this is
usually seen as a problem, a bad fit to the models, and something that should
be corrected. In a way, there is some circularity if we try to analyse general
intelligence (and derive the g factor) and at the same time one we assume that
agents are going to show a (decreasing) monotonicity between difficulty and
response.
By decoupling measures of generality and capability from the beginning, we
can actually see that there is variability in generality that is to be explained as
well, and can be done at the individual level. We can also analyse where the
generality and capability values locate for a particular individual (be it human,
non-human animal or machine) and then, and only then, study how it evolves
collectively (as a group, population or species) or in terms of development. Once
this is done, we can finally analyse that if resources are a (selective or designing)
pressure, then the compactness property (#2) says that generality will appear
in several situations, as we see in the animal kingdom, and more incipiently in
AI.
As discussed elsewhere [44, 41], the evaluation in AI is now facing some of the
challenges the evaluation of intelligence for humans and animals have faced for
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over a century. However, we do not have the notion of a population (or a species)
in AI. But this can be taken as an opportunity rather than a limitation, and
think of notions of difficulty that are not based on a population. The advantage
in AI is that tasks can be understood computationally, and difficulty can be
linked to several theoretical and empirical notions of complexity and resources
in the field.
Overall, the vindication of generality as a standalone score reframes the
question of what “General Intelligence” is and how it can be measured in a
different way, disentangling the conflation between generality and capability.
For machines, it can help recover the meaning that the G in “Artificial General
Intelligence” was originally meant to have.
The finally message of this report goes clearly in the direction of future
work. First, there is much to do to further clarify existing and newly-introduced
notions of difficulty for different kinds of tasks, or even universally, for all tasks,
and use them in the analysis of results. Second, using ad-hoc measures of
difficulty (even if they are imperfect), we can already analyse the individual
generality of a myriad of results already collected for humans and non-human
animals, and an increasing number of repositories of results for AI systems.
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Appendix A. Proofs
In this appendix we include the proofs of the properties, lemmata and proposi-
tions.
Properties of generality
Despite being straightforward, in what follows we include the proofs for the
properties presented in section 3.3.
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Proposition 4. Given an agent with capability ψj, any positive translation by
k implies that capability becomes ψj   k.
Proof. A translation creates a new function such that h1 Ð h k and ψrh1sj  1









j dh  k   ψj
Proposition 5. Given an agent with capability ψj where the |l|-leftmost part of
the original curve was saturated, any negative translation by k ¤ l implies that
capability becomes ψj  k.



















j dh  l  k   ψj  l  ψj  k
Proposition 6. With the same conditions as the above two propositions, gen-
erality is invariant to translation.


























From proposition 4 we have that ψ1j  k   ψj . Putting both things together
into the definition of spread (Eq. 4), we have:
z1j 
b





  2mj   2kψj  pk   ψjq2

b
k2   2mj   2kψj  k2  2kψj  ψ2j 
b
2mj  ψ2j
As generality is the reciprocal of spread, and spread does not change, then it
is invariant to positive translation. The proof for the negative translation is
similar.
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Proposition 7. Compactness: any mass moved to the left of the plot such that
ψ
rh1:h2s
j Ð ψrh1:h2sj   q while ψrh3:h4sj Ð ψrh3:h4sj  q, with h2   h3 will increase
γj.
Proof. Clearly, ψ1j  ψj , since the same mass q is included in the integral one














































j dh, and hence m
1




2m1j  ψ12j 
b
2m1j  ψ2j  
b
2mj  ψ2j  zj
As spread is smaller, and generality is the reciprocal, this completes the proof.
Corollary 8. Maximum: given a fixed capability ψj, the minimum expected
difficulty Hj and the maximum generality γj are obtained with a step agent
characteristic function on h  ψj.
Proof. By proposition 7, generality is increased as far as we move mass of the
function from right to left, while keeping the area constant. This means that
the maximum area with highest generality is obtained by a step function, whose
location must be on h  ψj .
Proposition 9. Step function: given a step function, capability is double the
expected difficulty (i.e., ψj  2Hj), and generality γj  8.
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2  l2  0, so its reciprocal is 8.
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Proposition 10. Constant: given a constant function ψ
rhs
j  c from 0 to q, we
have ψj  cq, zj 
a




























We have two examples at the bottom of Figure 2. For instance, on the left we
have ψj  cq  0.2  2  5  4.97, zj 
a
cp1 cqq a0.2p0.8q25  10  9.93
and γj  1{
a
cp1 cqq  1{10  0.10. The precision divergence is given because
the curves are not perfectly flat.
Proposition 11. Task transitivity: if an agent πj is s-saturated then for every
task µb such that A
j
b  1 in the saturated area then for all other tasks a with
~pµaq ¤ ~pµbq we have that Aja  1.
Proof. If an agent s is s-saturated then Ajb  1 for all tasks such that ~pµbq ¤ s.
If b is in the saturated area, any other task a of lower difficulty also is.
Proposition 12. Agent transitivity: if two agents πa and πb have maximum
generality γa  γb  8 and ψa ¤ ψb then for every task µi such that Aai  1
then Abi  1.
Proof. It is sufficient to see that both agents will have step functions.
Note that if the generality of πb is not infinite, it is not sufficient to have
a curve for πb that covers the curve for πa. The reason is that there might be
values of h for which 0   ψrhsa   ψrhsb   1, and in these cases some of tasks that
make the non-zero value in ψ
rhs




Proposition 13. Same units: if we introduce a unit for difficulty, let us call
it bints (for basic intelligence units), then capability is also measured in bints,
spread is also measured in bints and hence generality is measured in 1{bints.
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Proof. As ψj is an integral over difficulty and the domain of the function is
unitless (accomplishment, which is a proportion), then ψj has the same units













bints2, which means that spread is measured in bints, and the reciprocal
for generality.
Proofs when using a normal distribution for capability
Here we include the proofs about the case where the ACC derives from assuming
a normal distribution on capability.
Proposition 14. (proposition 1 in the paper) Assuming a normal distribution





Proof. (of proposition 1) We know that a normal distribution with mean µ and
standard deviation σ will lead to the following agent characteristic curve:
ψ
rhs






with Φ being the CDF of the standard normal distribution and φ being the
density function of the standard normal distribution. The maximum slope of











2σ2   1?
2πσ2





Lemma 15. (lemma 2 in the paper) Assuming a normal distribution on the
capability, with mean µ and standard deviation σ, such that the location is suf-




Proof. (of lemma 2) As in proposition 1), we know that a normal distribution











We plug this into the definition of effort and operate a little bit on it in order

























Fortunately, we can find the following integral of the moment of the CDF on
page 402 (second last, entry 10,001) in [98]:»
xΦpa  bxq dx  1
2b2
 pb2x2  a2  1qΦpa  bxq   pbx aqφpa  bxq  C
And φ is the density function.





















































Proposition 16. (proposition 3 in the paper) With the same assumptions as
lemma 2, we have that spread zj  σ and γ  1σ .
Proof. (of proposition 3) As the normal distribution is symmetric, we have that
the location of the CDF is of course µ, so the capability ψj  µ, and plugging
mj from lemma 2, we have:
zj 
b











 µ2  σ
And by the definition of generality we have γj  1σ .
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K.R. Thórisson, and M. Looks, editors, Artificial General Intelligence,
volume 6830, pages 82–91. LNAI, Springer, 2011. 35
[44] J. Hernández-Orallo, D. L. Dowe, and M. V. Hernández-Lloreda. Univer-
sal psychometrics: Measuring cognitive abilities in the machine kingdom.
Cognitive Systems Research, 27:5074, 2014. 33, 37
[45] J. Hernández-Orallo, D. L. Dowe, and M. V. Hernández-Lloreda. Measur-
ing cognitive abilities of machines, humans and non-human animals in a
unified way: towards universal psychometrics. Technical Report 2012/267,
Faculty of Information Technology, Clayton School of I.T., Monash Uni-
versity, Australia, March 2012. 33
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[48] José Hernández-Orallo. A computational definition of consilience. Philo-
sophica, 61(1):19–37, 1998. 36
[49] José Hernández-Orallo. Constructive reinforcement learning. Interna-
tional Journal of Intelligent Systems, 15(3):241–264, 2000. 36
47
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[101] Ricardo BC Prudêncio, José Hernández-Orallo, and Adolfo Martınez-Usó.
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